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Abstract:
We report evidence that the presence of hidden liquidity is associated with greater liquidity in 
the order books, greater trading volume, and smaller price impact. Limit and market order 
submission behavior changes when hidden liquidity is present consistent with at least some 
traders being able to detect hidden liquidity. We estimate a model of liquidity provision that 
allows us to measure variations in the marginal and total payoffs from liquidity provision in 
states with and without hidden liquidity. Our estimates of the expected surplus to providers of 
visible and hidden liquidity are positive and typically of the order of one-half to one basis 
points per trade. The positive liquidity provider surpluses combined with the increased trading 
volume when hidden liquidity is present are both consistent with liquidity externalities.  
JEL Classification: G10, G14 
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1 Introduction 
Transparency is, in general, a desirable quality in markets, but there is still no agreement on how 
much transparency is optimal. In their survey of limit order markets, Parlour and Seppi (2008) describe 
the transparency choice in limit order markets as a continuum from a closed book, with no 
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patriks@virginia.edu. order disclosure, to an open book, with full real-time order disclosure. In practice, most limit order
markets use a market design that lies between the two extremes and allows traders to submit hidden
liquidity. A prerequisite for assessing the optimality of this market design is a better understanding
of how the behavior of market participants change when hidden liquidity is present. We provide
that by examining the interaction between visible and hidden liquidity and overall liquidity and
trading activity.
The argument for hidden liquidity rests on the idea that some degree of opacity may be needed
to attract orders from large traders to the order book. Large traders may be reluctant to submit
orders to a fully transparent order book for fear of revealing their trading intentions. Without the
option to submit hidden liquidity, the large traders’ orders may migrate to oﬀ-exchange venues
or after-hours trading, or be broken up over time to minimize price impact. With the option to
submit hidden liquidity, the argument goes, large traders are more likely to submit their orders to
the order book leading to a deeper order book which leads to more trading and more of the gains
from trade being realized. But a critical step in the argument, which has not been addressed in
the literature, is how any hidden liquidity interacts with the behavior of liquidity demanders and
other liquidity providers. The beneﬁts may be small if hidden liquidity from large traders simply
displaces liquidity from other liquidity providers. Alternatively, the impact could be negative if
uncertainty about the amount of hidden liquidity or the motives of the large traders cause other
liquidity providers to back away and submit fewer or smaller limit orders. The same uncertainty
may cause liquidity demanders to be more cautious and submit fewer or smaller market orders.
We report evidence on how liquidity demanders and other liquidity providers respond to hidden
liquidity that lends some new support to the argument for hidden liquidity.
Exchanges often add the option to submit hidden liquidity by creating a diﬀerent type of limit
order that is known as an iceberg order.1 An iceberg order is a limit order that speciﬁes a price,
a total order size, and a visible peak size. The peak size is the maximum number of shares that
1This type of order is known as a reserve order in some markets. Completely hidden orders can be submitted in
some markets and some markets (e.g., BATS Trading) allow both reserve and hidden orders. In ﬁxed-income markets
there is a type of reserve order known as a expandable limit order that gives the submitter the option but not the
obligation to trade more when the initial size has been executed (see Boni and Leach (2004)) but iceberg orders are
also used (see Fleming and Mizrach (2008)).
2is displayed to the market at any time. The remainder of the iceberg order is not displayed in
the order book. When the ﬁrst peak size has been fully executed, the visible part is immediately
replenished by a size equal to the peak size. At a given price level in the order book all displayed
order depth has time priority relative to any hidden depth, irrespective of the order entry times.
Because of the replenishment rule, which adds a new peak size immediately after the current visible
peak size is executed, an iceberg order is likely to be detected, after its ﬁrst peak executes, by acute
observers of the order book. A sequence of events that includes a trade followed by a new order
at the same price with a minimal delay is a signal of an iceberg order. Therefore, one might argue
that what large traders are able to or choose to hide by using iceberg orders is not so much their
intentions to buy or sell the stock but the size of their desired trades.
We measure the impact that iceberg orders have on the order books and the price dynamics
using a sample from German Stock Exchange’s Xetra platform that includes iceberg and limit
orders. On average, order books with one or more iceberg orders at the best quotes have greater
visible depth and narrower inside spreads. The price impact of market orders, the market order
size, the conditional probability of a buy versus a sell market order, and the expected duration
to the next market order also change when iceberg orders are present. For example, when there
is an iceberg order at the best ask quote we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction in the price impact of
buy market orders, a signiﬁcant increase in the size of buy market orders, a signiﬁcant increase in
the conditional probability of a buy market order, and a shorter expected time until the next buy
market order. The net eﬀect is that iceberg orders are associated with increased liquidity supply
and demand consistent with a positive liquidity externality.
We estimate a state-dependent model of liquidity provision in a limit order book that takes
into account how the priority rules aﬀect the payoﬀs to visible and hidden liquidity. We extend
the empirical approach of Sand˚ as (2001) to allow liquidity provision to depend on the existence of
iceberg orders at either the best bid or ask quotes.2 The iceberg state variable also permit diﬀerences
in the market order ﬂow and the price impact of market orders in line with the empirical regularities
2Frey and Grammig (2006) implement the tests of Sand˚ as (2001) on the Xetra sample that we use and ﬁnd
qualitatively similar results. The zero-proﬁt conditions are rejected when applied directly to the total and visible
order book depths. Neither study considers state-dependence or accounts for the impact of the priority rules with
visible and hidden liquidity.
3discussed above. We focus on the case in which traders can perfectly detect the presence of iceberg
orders but do not observe their total size. We verify that our ﬁndings are robust to uncertainty
about iceberg orders by implementing our model using the predictions generated by an iceberg
detection algorithm instead of the actual knowledge of the icebergs.
Our empirical results show that the expected payoﬀs of diﬀerent liquidity provision strategies
change with iceberg orders. For example, payoﬀs to marginal limit orders at the best quotes are
negative in order books with no iceberg orders on the same side but positive with iceberg orders
on the same side. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is consistent with existing evidence but the second ﬁnding,
which is new, demonstrates the iceberg orders’ indirect impact on the payoﬀs to liquidity provision.
The positive impact of the iceberg order on the payoﬀs of limit orders is driven by the smaller
price impact of market orders that hit the book. The systematic variations in the expected payoﬀs
suggest that liquidity providers do not completely equalize the marginal payoﬀs across the diﬀerent
order book levels and states.
Based on the model parameter estimates we calculate the surplus that accrues to liquidity
providers. Our surplus measure is the expected gain to all limit orders taking into account the
probability of the order being executed and the associated price impact. Our surplus estimates are,
in general, positive and of the order of one-half to one basis points per trade. Given the increased
trading volume when hidden liquidity is present and the positive surplus accruing to liquidity
providers it suggests that periods with hidden liquidity are associated with liquidity externalities.
There is a large literature on market transparency which is often classiﬁed along the pre-trade
versus post-trade dimensions.3 Hidden liquidity is an example of a pre-trade transparency issue but
there are several others. The complexity of the issue of pre-trade transparency arises because the
nature of the trade-oﬀs involved change with the trading mechanism, the type of information that
is disclosed, and the participants to whom information is disclosed.4 A number of studies focus
3See the sections on market transparency in O’Hara (1995), Madhavan (2000), and Biais, Glosten, and Spatt
(2005) for in-depth discussions.
4Biais (1993), Madhavan (1995), Madhavan (1996), Pagano and R¨ oell (1996), Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (2000),
Baruch (2005), Moinas (2006), Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) among others develop theoretical models
of transparency and Flood, Huisman, Koedijk, and Mahieu (1999) and Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1999) carry out
experimental studies of trading in diﬀerent transparency regimes. A number of empirical studies including Anand
and Weaver (2004), Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005), Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007), Hendershott and Jones
(2005), Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) focus on the impact of changes in market transparency.
4speciﬁcally on hidden orders or iceberg orders. Pardo and Pascual (2006) and Tuttle (2006) ﬁnd
evidence consistent with iceberg orders being perceived as uninformed orders. A number of studies
have focused on diﬀerent aspects of the decision problem faced by a submitter of an iceberg order.
Esser and M¨ onch (2007) focus on the trade-oﬀ between price and peak size of the iceberg order.
Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2008) and D’Hondt and De Winne (2007) study how
the decision to not display the full order interacts with other dimensions of the trader’s order choice
problem. Harris (1996) studies how variations in the minimum tick size inﬂuence the willingness
to display larger order quantities. Aitken, Berkman, and Mak (2001) examine variation in the use
of hidden orders around a change in the threshold size for such orders. We add to this literature
by focusing on how the presence of iceberg orders inﬂuence the payoﬀs and the strategies of other
liquidity providers and how liquidity demanders respond to the presence of hidden liquidity.
2 Our Sample
Our sample includes all order entries, trades, and cancellations in the thirty stocks in the DAX-30
German blue chip index for the period January 2nd to March 31st, 2004. Our sample is from the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s electronic trading platform Xetra and provides detailed information
that enables us to reconstruct complete histories for individual orders and for the visible and hidden
portions of the limit order books. Table A1, in the appendix, reports descriptive statistics for the
sample stocks. In 2004, trading on Xetra accounted for approximately 75% of all domestic equity
trading. Equity trading oﬀ the Xetra platform was split between over-the-counter trading, which
accounted for approximately 19%, and, ﬂoor trading and trading on regional exchanges, which
together accounted for approximately 6%.5
On Xetra, traders can, in addition to market and limit orders, submit iceberg orders.6 An
5The statistics for overall domestic equity trading in Germa n ya r eb a s e do nt h es t a t i s t i c sreported by the Federation
of European Securities Exchanges (http://fese.eu) and by the Deutsche B¨ orse Group (2005 Factbook).
6Iceberg orders were added to the Xetra system in 2000, three years after its introduction. Other examples of
markets that have introduced iceberg orders or converted other the types of hidden liquidity to iceberg orders after
introducing an electronic limit order book include the London Stock Exchange, which introduced iceberg orders in
2003, and the Toronto Stock Exchange, which reintroduced iceberg orders in 2002 after a six-year period without
iceberg orders. The Australian Stock Exchange recently replaced its undisclosed order type with an iceberg order.
Recently, the New York Stock Exchange proposed to add reserve orders that are similar to iceberg orders. Securities
Industry News, March 31st, 2008, “NYSE Will Oﬀer Electronic Reserve Orders.”
5iceberg order speciﬁes a price, a total size, and a peak size. The peak size is the maximum visible
volume of the order. When a trader submits an iceberg order, the ﬁrst peak size is visible in the
order book. At that time, the hidden volume of the order is equal to the order’s total size minus
its peak size. When the ﬁrst peak size has been fully executed, the visible part is automatically
replenished by a number of shares equal to the peak size, and the hidden part is reduced by the
corresponding number of shares. The replenishment of the visible part continues automatically
until the hidden volume is depleted or the trader cancels the iceberg order.
In the order book, an order is given priority according to price, display condition, and time. A
sell order at a lower price has priority relative to any sell orders at higher prices, irrespective of
the order’s time of submission or display condition. At the same price level, a displayed order has
priority relative to any hidden orders regardless of the order’s time of submission. Among displayed
orders, an order submitted earlier has priority relative to any orders submitted later. When an
iceberg order’s visible part is replenished and the next peak size converts from hidden to displayed
status the newly visible peak size also receives a new time stamp which determines its time priority.
We reconstruct the sequence of order books from the event histories in the sample. The order
records include a ﬂag for an iceberg order which we use to construct complete histories for all limit
and iceberg orders. From these histories we reconstruct snapshots of the visible and hidden order
books before each transaction. In addition, we construct individual order histories that we use
to examine the placement, execution, cancellation, and duration of limit and iceberg orders. We
restrict our sample to orders submitted during the continuous trading period. Continuous trading
on Xetra starts after an opening auction, ends with a closing auction, and stops for a few minutes,
in the middle of the day, for an auction. The reconstruction takes into account the eﬀects that
any order submissions, transactions, or cancellations in the auctions have on the state of the order
book during continuous trading.
Iceberg orders are designed to solve a problem of transacting a large number of shares so we
expect the orders to be larger than limit orders, but they may also diﬀer along other dimensions.
Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics that show some of the diﬀerences between iceberg
and limit orders. The iceberg orders’ share of all submitted and executed shares are reported in
6Table 1. We exclude all market orders and any marketable limit or iceberg orders in calculating
the percentages. Across all stocks, iceberg orders represent 9% of all shares submitted, but they
represent 16% of all shares executed implying a higher execution rate for iceberg orders than for
limit orders. The higher execution rate cannot be explained by diﬀerences in order size since both
measures are expressed in numbers of shares rather than in number of orders. They may, however,
be driven by diﬀerences in the price (order placement) and duration of iceberg orders.
The rightmost two columns of Table 1 report the median distance between the same-side best
quotes and the iceberg and limit order prices. There is not a clear pattern in the median distances.
While the iceberg orders, on average, are placed closer to the best quotes for large and medium
stocks the evidence is mixed for the smaller stocks. Overall, the cross-sectional average of the
median distances is 3.6 basis points for iceberg orders and 3.9 basis points for limit orders. An
average diﬀerence of 0.3 basis points is small in comparison to the average half-spread of 3.6 basis
points (Table A1). The relatively small diﬀerence and the mixed ordering across sub-samples
suggest that a diﬀerence in the typical order placement is not likely to be the main driver of
diﬀerences in execution rates.
The middle four columns (columns four through seven) of Table 1 report statistics on the order
sizes. The last entries of the fourth and ﬁfth columns report that, on average, the limit order size
is a 1,000 shares whereas the peak size of an iceberg order is 2,600 shares implying that the visible
part of an iceberg order is between two and three times the size of a typical limit order. The sixth
column, labeled ‘Total Size/Peak Size,’ reports the average of the ratio of the iceberg order’s total
size to its peak size. The average ratios are with one exception between 5 and 10 which reﬂects
clustering at even multiples such as ﬁve or ten times the peak size. The column labeled ‘Executed
Shares/Peak Size’ reports the ratio of executed shares to peak size for all iceberg orders whose
ﬁrst peak size was executed. The average ratio of 4.6 implies that, on average, iceberg orders are
replenished almost four times conditional on the ﬁrst peak size being executed and therefore almost
80% of the executed iceberg shares originate from initially hidden volume.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the percentage of limit and iceberg orders that are either partially or
fully executed. Forty-seven percent of all iceberg orders receive at least a partial execution whereas
7the corresponding ﬁgure for limit orders is only fourteen percent. The last column of Panel A
reports the ratio of the median duration for iceberg orders to the median duration of limit orders.
The ratio of median durations of 7.1 shows that iceberg orders spend a substantially longer time in
the order book. Holding other things equal, one would expect that a longer time spent in the order
book would lead to a greater chance of order execution. Another implication of a longer duration
is that the fraction of limit order books that contain iceberg orders is greater than the fraction of
shares submitted that are iceberg orders.
We create two sub-samples of iceberg orders and matched limit orders to determine if the
execution of iceberg and limit orders diﬀers after the ﬁrst peak of an iceberg order is executed.
Panel B of Table 2 reports, for two sub-samples, the execution rates and the ratio of median time-
to-ﬁll for iceberg and limit orders. The samples are selected to isolate possible diﬀerences in the
information that is available to the market as a function of how long the iceberg order has been in
the order book.
The sub-sample labeled ‘First Peak’ consists of iceberg orders that at the time of the observation
(i) have zero shares executed, (ii) have a peak size that diﬀers by 10% or less from the modal peak
size, and (iii) have an order price relative to the same-side best quote that falls between the 30th
and 70th percentile for all iceberg orders. The matching limit order sample includes all limit orders
with order sizes and quantities that fall within the price and size cut-oﬀs for the iceberg orders. The
sub-sample labeled ‘Second Peak’ includes only iceberg orders whose ﬁrst peak size, at the time of
the observation, has been executed. The execution of the ﬁrst peak implies that, at the time of
the execution, the iceberg order was at the front of the order queue. Accordingly, in the matching
limit order sample we keep only the limit orders that undercut the best quote and therefore also
are at the front of the order queue.
The execution frequencies for the First Peak sample are comparable with an average of 86% for
limits and 90% for iceberg orders. The average ratio of the median time-to-ﬁll is 1.0 implying that
iceberg orders that are less likely to be detected are similar to otherwise similar limit orders along
these two dimensions. The execution frequencies for the Second Peak sample are also comparable
for the matched iceberg and limit order samples although the relative ordering is reversed relative
8to the First Peak. The time-to-ﬁll, however, is shorter for iceberg orders with an average ratio of
0.7. Out of the thirty ratios, 23 are below 1 and only one ratio is above one (TUI). Iceberg orders
that are more likely to have been detected appear to attract market orders generating executions
more rapidly than otherwise comparable limit orders. Overall, the higher execution frequencies of
iceberg orders may reﬂect both the longer order durations and a tendency for iceberg orders to
attract market order ﬂow.
3 Order Books, Price Dynamics and Iceberg Orders
The hidden depth, larger size, and longer duration of iceberg orders may lead them to have a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on both the order books and the price dynamics around trades. In this section,
we examine more closely the interaction between iceberg orders, the limit order books, the price
impact of market orders, and the market order ﬂow. For tractability we make some simplifying
assumptions. We condition on whether or not an iceberg order is present at the best bid or ask
quotes, but we do not condition on the size of hidden depth. We focus on changes in the visible
depth in the order books with iceberg orders since, by deﬁnition, such order books have additional
hidden depth (See, Table 1). We restrict the focus to the two best bid and ask levels and iceberg
orders at the best levels.
3.1 The Limit Order Books and Iceberg Orders
Table 3 reports the average spreads and visible depths observed before transactions, conditional
on whether or not the order book contains iceberg orders. The order book snapshots are created
1/100th of a second before every transaction. Panel A reports that between 18 and 26% of all order
book snapshots have at least one iceberg order at either the best bid or ask quotes. For each stock
and iceberg scenario we compute an average spread and depth and we then compute and report
the cross-sectional means of the individual averages for the three categories; large, medium, and
small stocks. We also report the diﬀerence in the cross-sectional means and the number of stocks
that have a diﬀerence that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and of the same sign as the overall
diﬀerence.
9Panel B shows that the mean bid-ask spread for large stocks is 4.9 basis points for books without
iceberg orders and 4.1 basis points for books with at least one iceberg order on either the bid or
the ask side. Across all three groups, the mean spreads without iceberg orders are 0.7 to 1.2 basis
points wider than the spreads with one or more iceberg orders in the book. For all stocks, we reject
the null hypothesis of the diﬀerence in spreads being zero. The spread between the best and second
best price levels in the order book is narrower when there is an iceberg order at the opposite side of
the book, but it is wider when there is an iceberg order at the same side of the book. The spread
is 0.2 to 0.4 basis points narrower with the iceberg order at the opposite side and we reject the
null of no diﬀerence for 27 stocks. The diﬀerence is greater in magnitude when the iceberg order
is at the same side; the diﬀerence ranges from -0.6 to -1.4 basis points. The most common iceberg
scenario is an iceberg order at one side of the order book. In that scenario, the net eﬀect—adding
the change for the inside spread and the spreads between the best and second best quotes—is a
narrower spread for order books with iceberg orders.
Panel C shows that the visible depth at the best quote is greater when an iceberg order is
present at the best quote at either the opposite or the same side of the book with a greater increase
when the iceberg order is at the same side. The null hypothesis of no diﬀerence is rejected for 29
stocks in the same side case and for 23 stocks for the opposite side case. The magnitude of the
increase in the same side case corresponds to approximately an average-sized limit order and thus is
less than the peak size of a typical iceberg order. That means that traders submit fewer or smaller
limit orders when an iceberg order is present, but that the drop is small enough to increase the
net depth. The visible depth at the second level does not change much between books with and
without iceberg orders, with the exception of the medium stocks and iceberg orders at the opposite
side.
3.2 The Price Impact and Iceberg Orders
We estimate price impact regressions that allow the price impact of a market order to depend on
whether or not there is one or more iceberg orders in the limit order book. Let Δmq+τ denote the
change in the mid-quote, mq,f r o mt i m et to t + τ measured in basis points. We denote the size of
10the market order by m; m>0. The market order size is normalized for each stock so that m is
measured in units of the average market order size. Let d denote the sign of the market order at
time t, d = +1 for a buy market order, and d = −1f o ras e l lm a r k e to r d e r .
Let Ibid be an indicator that takes on a value of one, if there is at least one iceberg order at the
best bid level in the limit order book at time t.L e tIask be the corresponding indicator order for
the best ask level. We focus on a symmetric case in which the magnitude of the price impact of a
buy market order when an iceberg order is at the best ask is the same as that of a sell market order
when an iceberg order is at the best bid, holding other things equal. We use the indicators Ih and
Inh to diﬀerentiate the cases in which an iceberg order is at the side that the market order hits or
at the opposite side. If a buy market order arrives (d =+ 1 ) ,w es e tIh = Iask and Inh = Ibid, and,
if a sell market order arrives (d = −1), we set Ih = Ibid and Inh = Iask.
We estimate the regressions for the following three time horizons: 10 minutes, 30 trades, and
next trade. We include the next trade case primarily as a benchmark because such a short horizon
is likely to be inﬂuence by mechanical eﬀects due to the replenishment of iceberg orders. The longer
time horizons obviously add more noise but they are also less likely to pick up such mechanical
eﬀects. If the time horizon goes beyond the closing time we use the closing price as the revised
mid-quote.
We estimate the following regression for each stock:
Δmq+τ = c +( a0 + a1m)d +( ah
0 + ah
1m)dIh +( anh
0 + anh
1 m)dInh +  +τ. (1)
The baseline price impact without iceberg orders is determined by the parameters a0 and a1.T h e
parameters ah
0 and ah
1 capture any change in the price impact function for the case in which the
market order hits the order book side with an iceberg order. The parameters anh
0 and anh
1 capture
any change for the case in which the order book side that is not hit has an iceberg order.
Table 4 reports the average parameter estimates and standard errors for the large, medium,
and small sub-samples for the three time horizons. The magnitude of the estimates of a0 and a1
increase from large to small stocks and from next trade to either the 10 minute or the 30 trade
horizons. The average estimated baseline price impact for a unit market order and the 30 trade
11horizon—adding a0 and a1—is 2.3, 3.3, and 4.2 basis points for the large, medium, and small stocks.
The corresponding average impacts are almost identical for the 10 minute horizon. The change in
the ﬁxed and variable price impact (ah
0 and ah
1) when a market order hits the order book side with
an iceberg order (Ih) are both negative with estimates that are of a larger magnitude for the two
longer horizons. For example, for the large stocks the average expected net price impact of a unit
market order for the 30 trade horizon drops by approximately 80% from 2.2 to 0.3 basis points.
The estimates for the parameter for the ﬁxed component when an iceberg is present on the order
book side not hit by the market order (anh
0 ) are, on average, positive and range from 1.5 to 4.3
basis points for the 30 trade horizon. The variable component (anh
1 ) is on average negative but
typically not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The net eﬀect when an iceberg order is present at
side of the book not hit by the market order is therefore to increase the expected price impact by
between 1.5 to 4.3 basis points.
The bottom panel of Table 4 report results for an extended version of the price impact regression
that allows for asymmetric eﬀects for buy and sell orders. The number of stocks for which the joint
hypothesis of asymmetric ﬁxed eﬀects (diﬀerent a0 coeﬃcients) and variable eﬀects (diﬀerent a1
coeﬃcients) are rejected at the 1% level are reported. The evidence in favor of an asymmetric
price impact function is weak. The parameter estimates for the asymmetric eﬀect, which are not
reported, are in general small in magnitude relative to the symmetric case even in the cases that
reject the null.
3.3 The Market Order Flow and Iceberg Orders
In order to determine to what extent the characteristics of market orders change with icebergs in
the books we examine the size, direction, and duration for market orders for order books with and
without iceberg orders. To determine whether the market order size changes when iceberg orders are
present we regress the market order size on iceberg indicators. We report results for speciﬁcations
with symmetric buy and sell side eﬀects. We have also estimated asymmetric speciﬁcations but
the asymmetries are small relative to the parameters in the symmetric speciﬁcation. Panel A of
Table 5 reports the average parameter estimates and standard errors. The average estimates of
12c range from 0.92 and 0.95 which means that, on average, market orders are 5-8% smaller for
observations without iceberg orders. The estimates for Ih are positive and range from 0.37 to 0.50
implying that when there is an iceberg order at the side hit by the market order we observe 37%
to 50% larger market order quantities. The corresponding average estimates of the parameter on
Inh range from 0.12 for the large to 0.21 for the small stocks implying that even when the iceberg
order is at the side not hit by the market order we observe an increase in market order quantities
of 12 to 21%. The larger market order sizes in either direction may partly explain the greater price
impact for market orders that hit the non-iceberg side of the order book reported in Table 4.
In order to determine whether the presence of iceberg orders also aﬀects the direction of the
market order ﬂow we estimate a logit model of the probability of a buy market order. Panel B
reports the average marginal eﬀects, based on the logit model estimates, with standard errors in
parentheses. The marginal eﬀects are positive for Ih and negative for Inh.T h ep o s i t i v em a r g i n a l
eﬀect for Ih ranges from 0.14 to 0.16 and implies that, if the baseline probability is one-half, the
probability of observing a buy market when there is an iceberg at the best ask is between 0.64 and
0.66. The negative marginal eﬀect for Inh ranges from -0.13 to -0.15 implying that, with the same
baseline assumption, the probability of a buy market is between 0.35 and 0.37 when there is an
iceberg at the best bid.
Panel C reports the cross-sectional means of the parameter estimates for a log-ACD (Autore-
gressive Conditional Duration) model for the expected duration between market orders.7 Following
the literature, we remove time of day eﬀects using a spline function for thirty minute intervals.
Our speciﬁcation diﬀers from the baseline only in terms of the choice of additional explanatory
variables, which in our case are Ih and Inh. The parameter estimates for ω, α,a n dβ, while not our
primary focus, are comparable to the ones reported in Bauwens and Giot (2000) for NYSE stocks.
The average estimates for Ih are negative ranging from -0.05 to -0.09 implying a 5 to 9% decrease in
the normalized expected duration when there is an iceberg order at the side of the book hit by the
market order. The corresponding average estimates are positive for Inh, but smaller in magnitude,
ranging from 0.02 to 0.04 implying a 2 to 4% increase in the expected normalized duration when
7Bauwens and Giot (2000) present the log-ACD model as an extension of the ACD model introduced by Engle
and Russell (1998) that allows for other explanatory variables to determine the durations without a sign restriction.
13there is an iceberg at the side of the order book that is not hit by the market order.
3.4 Interpretation
The above results suggest that the presence of iceberg orders is associated with greater visible
depth and narrower spreads in the limit order book. Hidden liquidity is not simply displacing
visible liquidity in the order books. The presence of iceberg orders is associated with larger market
orders that tend to be skewed towards the side with the iceberg order. The price impact for a
market order that hits the side with an iceberg order is less than for an otherwise similar market
order suggesting that liquidity demanders may adjust their trading strategies to take advantage
of the variation in liquidity. Together these eﬀects suggest that the relative payoﬀs to providing
liquidity may vary along several dimensions in order books with iceberg orders. In the next section
we present a simple model that allows us to incorporate the price, display, and time priority rules
that determine how visible and hidden orders interact in the order book and to determine the net
eﬀects on the marginal payoﬀs to liquidity provision.
4M o d e l
Our model captures several key features that inﬂuence the interaction between visible and hidden
depth in limit order books. The model incorporates a price, display, and time priority rule and
captures the discriminatory nature of limit order executions. The model permits the price impact
function and the market order distribution to depend on whether or not there are iceberg orders
in the book.
4.1 Model Structure
Two types of players submit orders to the limit order book. Liquidity providers submit limit orders
to the order book and earn a compensation for their liquidity provision that depends on the value
of the stock conditional on their limit orders executing. Large traders may provide hidden liquidity
by submitting iceberg orders to the order book. We abstract from the large trader’s motivation for
trading and the details of her decision problem and focus instead on the response of the liquidity
14providers. From the liquidity providers’ perspective the arrival and replenishment of iceberg orders
follow some exogenous stochastic process. The expected payoﬀs to the liquidity providers depend
on the probability of a market order, the distribution of market order sizes, the limit order’s position
in the order book, and the possible size and location of any iceberg orders. All liquidity providers
agree on a fundamental value of X for the stock at time t; X may be interpreted as the liquidity
providers’ time t expectation of the liquidation value of the stock.
The time t market order is submitted by a trader who may be informed about the future value
of the stock. As in Section 3.2 we denote the size of the time t market order by m, and the direction
of the market order by d.
The following three components determine the observed change in the fundamental value be-
tween t and t + τ:ad r i f tt e r mμ, private information revealed by the market order ﬂow, and new
public information. The new fundamental value at t + τ, X+τ,i sg i v e nb y :
X+τ = X + μ +( α0 + α1m)d +  +τ, (2)
in which, α0 and α1 are parameters that measure the information content of the market order ﬂow,
d is plus one for a buy market and minus one for a sell market, and  +τ is a mean-zero, independent
random variable that reﬂects the impact of public news that arrives between t and t + τ.
The bid and ask sides of the limit order book at time t are characterized by a series of quotes,
p1,p 2,...,p K, with the index starting from the best quote. The total visible volume oﬀered at the
kth best quote is denoted by qk. The cumulative visible volume oﬀered at all quotes with equal or
higher priority to the kth best quote, pk, is denoted by Qk, and is determined as, Qk =
 
i≤k qi.
Accordingly the hidden volumes are denoted by ˆ qk and the cumulative hidden volumes by ˆ Qk.I n
our model we focus primarily on the hidden volume at the best quotes. Since liquidity providers
are risk neutral they care about the expected hidden depth, which we assume is the same for the
bid and ask side and denote by η = E[ˆ q1|ˆ q1 > 0].
We use the indicators Iown and Iopp to diﬀerentiate the cases in which an iceberg order is at
the ‘own’ side and ‘opposite’ side viewed from the perspective of a given limit order in the order
book. Let Iown be an indicator for an iceberg order on the own side, and let Iopp be an indicator
15for an iceberg order on the opposite side. It is convenient to summarize the information about the
state of the order book by a vector h that is deﬁned as h  =[ 1Iown Iopp]. The baseline case of
no iceberg orders at either side leads to h  = [1 0 0]. In the model traders know whether or not
the book contains iceberg orders at the best bid and ask quotes, i.e., they observe the value of h.
Section A1, in the appendix, provide a more detailed discussion on how traders may use market
data to detect the presence of iceberg orders.
4.2 The Order Book Without Iceberg Orders
Limit orders are executed in a discriminatory fashion. A limit sell order that is executed if a buy
market order of size m arrives is also executed by any larger buy market order. Upper- and lower-
tail expectations of the fundamental value determine the expected revision in the fundamental
value conditional on execution (as in Glosten (1994)). Given the symmetry assumption we deﬁne
a single tail expectation that we denote by x+τ(m,d;θ), which is deﬁned as the expected value of
X at t + τ, conditional on a market order at time t of size m or greater. Combining the aﬃne
price impact function of Equation (2) with the direction of the market order, d, the tail expectation
x+τ(m,d;θ)i sg i v e nb y :
x+τ(m,d;θ)=E[X+τ|X, ˜ m ≥ m,d]
= X + μ +( α0 + α1E[m|˜ m ≥ m])d (3)
with θ denoting the vector of parameters including μ, α0,a n dα1, and any parameters for the
distribution of m. The expected marginal payoﬀ conditional on execution for the marginal order
at the best ask quote is denoted by δvis
1 and is given by
δvis
1 = E[(p1 − X+τ)|m ≥ q1],
= p1 − x+τ(q1,d=1 ;θ)( 4 )
A similar equation can be derived for the best bid quote. The corresponding expected payoﬀ for a
marginal limit at the kth best level is obtained by replacing the single tail expectation, x+τ(q1,d;θ)
16in Equation (4), by x+τ(Qk,d;θ). Under perfect competition the δ’ sw o u l db ed r i v e nt ot h ep e r -
share order processing cost.
4.3 The Order Book With Iceberg Orders
With iceberg orders we have four possible states and the price impact function is characterized by
the parameter vectors α0 =[ αvis
0 αown
0 α
opp
0 ]a n dα1 =[ αvis
1 αown
1 α
opp
1 ]. The discounts or premia for
marginal liquidity provision are also state dependent and we refer to them as the marginal payoﬀs.
The case of no iceberg orders is the baseline case with marginal payoﬀs, δvis
1 and δvis
2 . The parameter
δown
1 measures the change in the marginal payoﬀ, relative to the baseline case, when there is an
iceberg order at the same side of the book. The parameter δ
opp
1 measures the corresponding change
in the marginal payoﬀ when the iceberg order is present at the opposite side of the order book. The
vectors δ1 =[ δvis
1 δown
1 δ
opp
1 ]a n dδ2 =[ δvis
2 δown
2 δ
opp
2 ] denote the state-dependent marginal payoﬀs.
The state-dependent single tail expectations for the best and second-best quotes, x+τ(q1,d;θ)
and x+τ(Q2,d;θ), take the following form:
x+τ(q1,d;θ)=X + μ +
 
α0h +( α1h)
 
E[m|m ≥ q1,h]
  
d,
x+τ(Q2,d;θ)=X + μ +
 
α0h +( α1h)
 
E[m|m ≥ Q2,h]+Iownη
  
d. (5)
In the ﬁrst tail expectation the indirect eﬀect of an iceberg order is captured through shifts in the
price impact per unit of market order measured by α0h and α1h and by shifts in the distribution
of market order quantities measured by E[m|m ≥ Q2,h]. The same indirect eﬀects apply to the
second tail expectation but in addition there is the direct eﬀect of the hidden liquidity captured by
the last term Iownη.
4.4 Liquidity Provider Surplus
The δ parameters in our model capture the marginal compensation, conditional on execution, for
the marginal units at diﬀerent levels in the order book. The expected surplus to all units take into
account the probability of execution and the corresponding tail expectations. Let πk(q)d e n o t et h e
expected surplus for the qth unit at quote k. Using Equation (3) we can write the surplus πk(q)
17for the ask side as
πk(q)=
  ∞
q
 
pk − x+τ(m,d =1 ;θ)
 
Pr(d =1 ;h)f(m;h,λ) dm (6)
where Pr(d =1 ; h) denotes the state dependent probability of a buy order and f(m;h,λ)t h e
probability distribution of the size of market orders with parameter vector λ. An equivalent formula
is used for the bid side.
Denote the aggregate expected surplus for the visible volume at quote k by Πk.W eo b t a i ni t
by integrating πk(q) for the visible volume at quote k
Πk =
Qk+ ˆ Qk−1  
Qk−1+ ˆ Qk−1
πk(q) dq (7)
w h e r ew eu s et h ed e ﬁ n i t i o no fQ0 =0a n d ˆ Q0 =0 .
The aggregate expected surplus for the hidden volume at quote k is ˆ Πk and calculated by
ˆ Πk =
Qk+ ˆ Qk  
Qk+ ˆ Qk−1
πk(q) dq (8)
The total liquidity provider surplus is obtained by adding across quotes of both sides of the
order book. By conditioning on the state or a subset of order book levels we can calculate various
components of the total surplus.
5 Empirical Results
We start by brieﬂy describing the parametrization of our model and our estimation strategy. We
then present the estimates of the model parameters and the marginal payoﬀs to liquidity provision.
Finally, we present our estimates of the expected surplus to liquidity providers.
185.1 Market Order Distribution
For the distribution of the market order size f(m;λ,h) we choose the exponential distribution with
state dependent parameter vector λ =( λvis,λ own,λ opp). The expected mean depends on the state
vector h: E[m;h]=λh,w h e r eλown and λopp equals the change of the expected mean from the
visible to the own and opposite iceberg states.
The state dependent probability of a buy market order Pr(d =1 ;h) is estimated by the state
dependent sample probabilities of buy market orders.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
We use the restrictions implied by the model to specify a set of moment conditions that we denote
by g(·). The state-dependent marginal payoﬀs generate a set of moment conditions that involve
the lower-tail and upper-tail expectations, the δ parameters, and the iceberg state vector h.H e r e
we use superscripts for the h vector to distinguish between the state viewed from the bid and the
ask sides of the order book:
g1(θ)= E
  
x+τ(q1,d= −1;θ) − p1 − δ1hbid
x+τ(Q2,d= −1;θ) − p2 − δ2hbid
 
⊗ hbid
 
=0 . (9)
and
g2(θ)= E
  
p1 − x+τ(q1,d=+ 1 ;θ) − δ1hask
p2 − x+τ(Q2,d=+ 1 ;θ) − δ2hask
 
⊗ hask
 
=0 . (10)
The state-dependent price impact and market order ﬂow imply the following set of moment
conditions:
g3(θ)= E
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
m − λhmkt
X+τ − X − μ −
 
α0hmkt 
d −
 
α1hmkt 
(d · m)  
X+τ − X − μ −
 
α0hmkt 
d −
 
α1hmkt 
(d · m)
 
d  
X+τ − X − μ −
 
α0hmkt 
d −
 
α1hmkt 
(d · m)
 
(d · m)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ⊗ hmkt
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ =0 . (11)
Finally, the hidden depth, η, is identiﬁed from the following two moment conditions:
g4(θ)= E
   
ˆ qask − η
 
1(ˆ qask > 0)  
ˆ qbid − η
 
1(ˆ qbid > 0)
 
=0 . (12)
19We replace X and X+τ by the mid-quotes observed immediately before the transactions at
times t and t + τ. We use the 30 trade time horizon. Using the 10 minute horizon yields similar
results. We stack the moment conditions, g1(·),...,g4(·) and estimate the model parameters using
GMM in two stages. In the second-stage estimation we use a Newey-West type weighting matrix
with a Bartlett kernel with 10 lags. Table 6 summarizes the parameters and the moment conditions
of our model.
5.3 Model Parameter Estimates
We estimate the model separately for each stock and report average parameter estimates and
standard errors for the large, medium, and small categories in Table 7. Panel A of Table 7 reports
the estimates for the price impact function. Overall, the parameter estimates for the price impact
function are very close to the estimates for the price impact regression reported in Table 4 (for
the 30 trade horizon). The price impact of market orders changes with the presence of iceberg
orders. When an iceberg order is present on the side that is hit by the market order (own side), the
net ﬁxed component of the price impact is approximately zero and the variable component impact
drops to approximately half of its baseline value. When the iceberg order is on the side opposite to
the side hit by the market order (opposite), the ﬁxed component increase by between 65 and 100%
whereas the variable component stays essentially unchanged.
Panel B reports the estimates for the marginal payoﬀs to liquidity provision at the best and
second best levels. On average, the δvis
1 estimates are negative and range from 0.8 to 1.6 basis
points. One interpretation of the negative estimates is that, on average, traders who determine
the marginal prices at the best bid or ask level have some intrinsic reason for trading. Accepting
a negative payoﬀ of this magnitude is rational if the alternative is to pay one-half of the bid-ask
spread, which range from approximately 2.4 basis points for the large category to 4.3 basis points
for the small category. The estimates of δvis
2 are positive and range from 1.2 to 2.4 basis points
implying that liquidity providers at the second best level expect to have a positive net payoﬀ after
accounting for the price impact.
The average estimates of the own side marginal payoﬀs, δown
1 and δown
2 , are positive across all
20three categories albeit that only the δown
1 estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for most
stocks. The positive marginal payoﬀ for liquidity providers at the best level is consistent with the
reasoning behind some form of order matching or front running strategy (Harris (1996)). Yet, the
fact that the marginal payoﬀ is signiﬁcant and positive would suggest these opportunities are not
fully exploited.
The average estimates of the opposite side marginal payoﬀs, δ
opp
1 and δ
opp
2 , are all negative and,
in general, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The negative payoﬀs for marginal limit orders in order
book on the side opposite an iceberg order may reﬂect the ‘buﬀer eﬀect’ of the iceberg order which
limits any favorable price movements for these limit orders.
Panel C of Table 7 reports the estimates for the mean market order size and hidden depth.
The estimates for the mean market order size—the λ’s—are close to the regression results reported
above in Table 5. The market order sizes are larger when iceberg orders are present with a stronger
eﬀect when the iceberg order is on the side hit by the market order. The mean hidden depth ranges
from 9 to 14 times the normal market order size.
5.4 Marginal Payoﬀs for Liquidity Provision
We compute the net marginal payoﬀs for liquidity provision to summarize how the payoﬀs vary
with the iceberg states. Table 8 reports the average values for the marginal payoﬀs to liquidity
provision by order book level and iceberg state and reports the number of signiﬁcant negative and
positive estimates. The top row reports the average values for δvis
1 and the top row of the second
half of the table reports the corresponding values for δvis
2 . Twenty-six of the stocks have negative
δvis
1 estimates (8+5+13) and positive δvis
2 estimates (8+7+11). This pattern in marginal payoﬀs is
in line with the results of Frey and Grammig (2006) and Sand˚ as (2001).
The second, third, and fourth rows of both panels report the average estimated marginal payoﬀs
as a function of whether the iceberg order is on the same side as the limit (own), the opposite side
(opp), and both side (own+opp). The marginal payoﬀs to liquidity provision tend to be positive
when liquidity is provided on the same side as an iceberg order and negative when it is provided
on the opposite side. These regularities apply in particular to the best level. For twenty-four of
21the stocks the net δ is positive in the ‘own’ case and none are signiﬁcantly negative compared to
twenty-six negative estimates for the baseline case. Similarly, when the iceberg is on the opposite
side the estimated net payoﬀ becomes signiﬁcantly negative for all but one stock. For the second
best level the ‘own’ side eﬀect is comparable whereas the ‘opp’ eﬀect is indistinguishable from zero
in most cases. The marginal payoﬀs for the cases with an iceberg order on both sides are often
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero which is consistent with the above eﬀects partly oﬀsetting each
other.
The positive marginal compensation for liquidity provision at the best level when iceberg orders
are present on the same side suggests that traders are not bidding aggressively enough or are
bidding relatively less aggressively when it is likely that their limit orders compete with hidden
liquidity. Similarly, at the second best quotes the results provide some support for the idea that
after controlling for other factors traders bid less aggressively when they are likely to compete with
hidden liquidity. A diﬀerence between the two levels, which is not reﬂected here, is that at the best
level the marginal order has priority relative to the iceberg order whereas the marginal order at the
second best level does not. This eﬀect will be accounted for in the expected surplus calculations in
the next subsection.
Conversely, when iceberg orders are on the opposite side we observe that traders are bidding
too aggressively. Of course, one may also interpret this as evidence that when iceberg orders are
present on the opposite side then liquidity traders tend to determine the marginal prices. Our
evidence on the order ﬂow suggests that when iceberg orders are present there is more frequent
and larger market orders making trades more likely on both sides of the book although the eﬀect
is stronger on the side with the hidden liquidity.
5.5 Liquidity Provider Surplus
We compute diﬀerent surplus estimates for liquidity providers based on the results in section 4.4.
Additional details on the surplus calculations are provided in Appendix A2. Table 9 reports the
average estimates of the expected liquidity provider surplus. Panel A reports the average expected
surplus for all states with (i) no iceberg orders and (ii) states with at least some iceberg orders at
22the best quotes. Average standard errors reported in parentheses account for sampling error in the
second-stage and the ﬁrst-stage estimation error for the model parameters. The standard errors
are computed under the assumption that the ﬁrst- and second-stage errors are independent. The
average estimates of the liquidity provider surpluses are positive for both no iceberg and iceberg
states but the only the estimates for the ﬁrst two groups are, on average, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
For individual stocks the estimates are positive for 28 stocks for the no iceberg states and for 23
stocks for the iceberg states. An expected surplus of 0.7 for large stocks and order books with at least
one iceberg order implies that collectively the liquidity providers expect to earn approximately 0.7
basis point per trade after subtracting the price impact. The corresponding bid-ask spread (Table
4) is 4.2 basis points so the expected surplus is approximately a third of the half-spread.
In Panel B the expected liquidity surplus is split by display condition—visible versus hidden—
and by iceberg state. The ﬁrst three rows report the surplus for all visible liquidity for order
books (states) with no iceberg orders and order books with at least one iceberg order at the best
bid or ask quote.8 The last row reports the average expected surplus for the hidden liquidity (in
iceberg states). The estimates are positive for both no iceberg and iceberg states for visible liquidity
albeit only the estimates for the large and medium category are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In
general, the estimates are close enough to each other that no meaningful ranking can be established
between the three diﬀerent states. The estimated surplus for hidden liquidity is also positive and
often signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The hidden liquidity obtains approximately a third of the
liquidity provider surplus.
In Panel C the liquidity provider surplus is split by the order book level—best quote versus the
2nd and 3rd best quotes—and by state. The top half of the panel reports surplus estimates for
the best quote level. The ﬁrst of the four rows provides the overall estimates and the next row the
estimate for states with no iceberg orders, followed by states with iceberg orders on the same side,
and iceberg orders on the opposite side of the order book. The bottom half of the panel provides
8The estimates for the no iceberg case diﬀer slightly from the estimate on the ﬁrst row of the table because the
deﬁnition of the states is based only on whether or not there are iceberg orders at the best quote levels. Hence, the
no iceberg cases include some iceberg orders that are not at the best bid or ask levels.
23the corresponding surplus estimates for the second best quote level. A comparison of the ﬁrst rows
of each block within the panel reveals that the positive overall surplus reported in Panels A and B
masks a negative surplus for the best quote level and a correspondingly larger positive surplus for
the second best level.
The individual estimates for each stock support this with 25 stocks showing signiﬁcant negative
surplus for the best level and signiﬁcant positive surplus for the second best level. Several of the
exceptions to this pattern are among the lower-priced stocks that have positive surplus for both
levels.
The diﬀerence between marginal compensation and the overall surplus is particularly clear for
the second best order book level when comparing the no iceberg and iceberg (own) states. The
marginal compensation increases with an iceberg on the same side (the own case) but the expected
surplus declines sharply. The diﬀerence is that in the iceberg case the depth ahead of any orders
on the second best level is much higher so while the marginal compensation is relatively high the
surplus is much less because the execution probability is much lower.
6 Conclusions
We show that the hidden liquidity changes the behavior of both liquidity providers and liquidity
demanders. In general, periods with hidden liquidity in the order books are associated with greater
overall liquidity and more trading suggesting that these are periods in which more of the gains
from trade are realized. One interpretation of these ﬁndings is that market participants view
iceberg orders as positive shock to liquidity. An alternative and not necessarily mutually exclusive
interpretation is that iceberg orders tend to be submitted in markets that are, in general, more
liquid.
A limitation of our approach is that we take as given the arrival and duration of iceberg orders.
The alternatives for a trader who submits the iceberg order may include trading oﬀ the exchange or
splitting up his order into smaller orders that are submitted to the order book over time. Careful
modeling of these trade-oﬀs could yield new insights about the economics of hidden liquidity and
the trade-oﬀs between transparency and liquidity. Among other things it may alow us to more
24deﬁnitively determine which of the above interpretations is closer to the truth. The study by
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) of trading at Euronext demonstrates that both iceberg
orders and active trading outside the limit order book coexist.
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30Table 3: Limit Order Books and Iceberg Orders
Large Medium Small
Panel A: Iceberg States
Percent of Total Number of Observations 17.7 25.7 17.8
Panel B: Spreads
Bid-Ask Spread [basis points]
(a) No Iceberg 4.9 7.0 8.7
(b) Iceberg Opposite/Same 4.1 6.2 7.5
Diﬀerence (a)-(b) (# p-value < 0.001) 0.8 (8) 0.7 (7) 1.2 (15)
2nd Best Quote - Best Quote [bp]
(a) No Iceberg 3.3 5.3 5.7
(b) Iceberg Opposite 3.0 5.0 5.3
(c) Iceberg Same 4.0 5.8 7.1
Diﬀerence (a)-(b) (# p-value < 0.001) 0.3 (7) 0.2 (7) 0.4 (13)
Diﬀerence (a)-(c) (# p-value < 0.001) -0.7 (7) -0.6 (7) -1.4 (15)
Panel C: Depth
Depth at Best Quote [1,000 shares]
(a) No Iceberg 5.5 4.8 2.1
(b) Iceberg Opposite 5.9 5.6 2.3
(c) Iceberg Same 6.7 5.8 2.7
Diﬀerence (a)-(b) (# p-value < 0.001) -0.4 (5) -0.9 (6) -0.2 (12)
Diﬀerence (a)-(c) (# p-value < 0.001) -1.2 (8) -1.1 (6) -0.6 (15)
Depth at 2nd Best Quote [1,000 shares]
(a) No Iceberg 8.8 6.6 2.5
(b) Iceberg Opposite 8.7 7.4 2.7
(c) Iceberg Same 8.9 6.5 2.3
Diﬀerence (a)-(b) (# p-value < 0.001) 0.1 (1) -0.9 (6) -0.2 (6)
Diﬀerence (a)-(c) (# p-value < 0.001) -0.1 (1) 0.0 (5) 0.1 (11)
Panel A reports the percent of all observations that have at least one iceberg at the best bid or ask quotes
and are classiﬁed as iceberg states. Panels B and C report average spreads and depths in the order books
observed before transactions according to the iceberg status. The No Iceberg group includes all order books
with no iceberg orders at either best quotes. The Iceberg Opposite group includes the bid side of all order
books with an iceberg order at the best ask side, and vice versa. The Iceberg Same group includes the bid
side of all order books with an iceberg order at the best bid side, and vice versa. All averages are ﬁrst
computed by stock and then averaged across stocks within the large, medium, and small sub-samples. Next
to the mean diﬀerences, in parenthesis, is the number of stocks within each group that have a mean diﬀerence
that has the same sign as the overall mean diﬀerence and a p-value of 0.001 or less for a test of the null that
the diﬀerence is zero.
31Table 4: Price Impact and Iceberg Orders
Large Medium Small
Panel A: Price Impact Regression:
Δmq+τ = c +( a0 + a1m)d +( ah
0 + ah
1m)dIh +( anh
0 + anh
1 m)dInh +  +τ.
Time horizon: τ =1 0m i n u t e s
Intercept -0.12 (0.05) -0.57 (0.08) 0.10 (0.10)
d 1.73 (0.07) 2.67 (0.10) 3.20 (0.14)
md 0.41 (0.04) 0.57 (0.06) 0.97 (0.08)
dIh -1.73 (0.20) -2.43 (0.24) -3.71 (0.42)
mdIh -0.09 (0.09) -0.13 (0.11) -0.43 (0.18)
dInh 1.94 (0.26) 2.61 (0.29) 3.86 (0.53)
mdInh -0.10 (0.12) -0.12 (0.14) -0.21 (0.25)
Time horizon: τ =3 0t r a d e s
Intercept -0.14 (0.03) -0.28 (0.05) -0.19 (0.10)
d 1.88 (0.03) 2.64 (0.06) 3.21 (0.13)
md 0.46 (0.02) 0.63 (0.04) 0.99 (0.08)
dIh -1.84 (0.10) -2.26 (0.15) -4.14 (0.40)
mdIh -0.19 (0.05) -0.23 (0.07) -0.39 (0.17)
dInh 1.53 (0.13) 2.21 (0.18) 4.30 (0.51)
mdInh -0.10 (0.06) -0.12 (0.08) -0.32 (0.24)
Time horizon: τ =n e x tt r a d e
Intercept -0.00 (0.00) -0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
d 1.00 (0.01) 1.61 (0.01) 2.02 (0.02)
md 0.29 (0.00) 0.44 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
dIh -1.02 (0.02) -1.62 (0.03) -2.03 (0.07)
mdIh -0.18 (0.01) -0.23 (0.01) -0.35 (0.03)
dInh -0.08 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.16 (0.09)
mdInh -0.02 (0.01) -0.06 (0.02) -0.07 (0.04)
Panel B: Asymmetric Price Impact Regression:
Δmq+τ = [baseline model as above]...
+
 
ˆ ah
0Ih +ˆ anh
0 Inh +ˆ a1md +ˆ ah
1mdIh +ˆ anh
1 mdInh 
1d=−1 + e+τ
# Rejections: F-Test of H0:ˆ ah
0 =ˆ anh
0 =0
τ = 1 0 m i n u t e s 636
τ = 3 0 t r a d e s 214
τ = n e x t t r a d e 222
# Rejections: F-Test of H0:ˆ a1 =ˆ ah
1 =ˆ anh
1 =0
τ = 1 0 m i n u t e s 523
τ = 3 0 t r a d e s 110
τ =n e x tt r a d e 4 5 1 1
Panel A reports average parameter estimates and standard errors for price impact regressions with three
diﬀerent time horizons, 10 minutes, 30 trades and next trade. The mid-quote change over the horizon is
regressed on a constant (c), and on the trade direction indicator (buy market: d =1 + ,s e l lm a r k e t :d = −1)
and the signed normalized market order quantity, dm, by themselves and with d and dm interacted with
iceberg indicators. The indicator Ih is one, if the side of the order book hit by the market order has an
iceberg order, for example, buy market order when there is an iceberg at the best ask quote. The indicator
Inh is one if the side of the order book that is not hit by the market order has an iceberg order. The mid-
quote changes are measured in basis points and the market order sizes are measured in units of the average
market order size. Panel B reports the number of rejections for a regression that allows for asymmetric price
impact for buy versus sell market orders.
32Table 5: Market Order Flow and Iceberg Orders
Large Medium Small
Panel A: Market Order Size (OLS)
m = c + b1Ih + b2Inh +  
Intercept 0.95 (0.004) 0.92 (0.005) 0.93 (0.006)
Ih 0.39 (0.010) 0.37 (0.011) 0.50 (0.020)
Inh 0.12 (0.014) 0.18 (0.014) 0.21 (0.026)
Panel B: Probability of a Buy Market Order (Logit)
Prob(market buy|Ih,Inh)= e
c+b1Ih+b2Inh
1+ec+b1Ih+b2Inh
Ih 0.16 (0.004) 0.14 (0.004) 0.14 (0.007)
Inh -0.15 (0.004) -0.13 (0.004) -0.14 (0.007)
Panel C: Market Order Duration (log-ACD):
log(E[xt]) = Ψt = ω + αlog(xt−1)+βΨt−1 + b1Ih + b2Inh
ω 0.10 (0.001) 0.08 (0.001) 0.06 (0.002)
α 0.10 (0.001) 0.08 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002)
β 0.81 (0.003) 0.85 (0.003) 0.89 (0.005)
Ih -0.09 (0.003) -0.06 (0.003) -0.05 (0.005)
Inh 0.04 (0.004) 0.02 (0.003) 0.02 (0.005)
Panel A reports average parameter estimates with standard errors for the normalized market order size
regressed on a constant and iceberg indicators. Panel B reports the cross-sectional means of the marginal
eﬀects for a logit model of the probability of a buy market order as a function of the iceberg indicators.
The marginal eﬀects are computed for a value of one for the indicator versus a value of zero, and averaged
across stocks within each category. The standard errors reported in parenthesis are computed for the average
marginal eﬀects for each stock, and are then averaged across stocks within each group. Panel C reports the
average parameter estimates for a log-ACD model (see, Bauwens and Giot (2000) and Engle and Russell
(1998)) of the (logarithm) of the expected duration between market orders. We remove time-of-day eﬀects
by ﬁtting a spline function on thirty minute intervals. The indicator Ih is one, if the side of the order book
hit by the market order has an iceberg order, for example, buy market order when there is an iceberg at the
best ask quote. The indicator Inh is one if the side of the order book that is not hit by the market order has
an iceberg order.
33Table 6: Model Summary
Orderbook Conditions - Ask Side
E
⎡
⎣
⎡
⎣ pask,1 − x+τ(qask,1,d=1 ;hask,θ) − δ1hask
pask,2 − x+τ(Qask,2,d=1 ;hask,θ) − δ2hask
⎤
⎦ ⊗ hask
⎤
⎦ =0
Orderbook Conditions - Bid Side
E
⎡
⎣
⎡
⎣ x+τ(qbid,1,d= −1;hbid,θ) − pbid,1 − δ1hbid
x+τ(Qbid,2,d= −1;hbid,θ) − pbid,2 − δ2hbid
⎤
⎦ ⊗ hbid
⎤
⎦ =0
Single Tail Expectations - 1st Quote
x+τ(q1,d;h,θ)=X + μ +
 
α0h +( α1h)
 
q1 + λh
  
d
Single Tail Expectations - 2nd Quote
x+τ(Q2,d;h,θ)=X + μ +
 
α0h +( α1h)
 
Q2 + λh + Iownη
  
d
Price Impact and Order Flow Conditions
E
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
m − λhmkt
X+τ − X − μ −
 
α0hmkt 
d −
 
α1hmkt 
(d · m)
 
X+τ − X − μ −
 
α0hmkt 
d −
 
α1hmkt 
(d · m)
 
d
 
X+τ − X − μ −
 
α0hmkt 
d −
 
α1hmkt 
(d · m)
 
(d · m)
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⊗ hmkt
t
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
=0
Hidden Depth Conditions
E
⎡
⎣
 
ˆ qask − η
 
1(ˆ qask > 0)
 
ˆ qbid − η
 
1(ˆ qbid > 0)
⎤
⎦ =0
C o n t i n u e do nn e x tp a g e
34Model Summary - continued
Model Variables
p.,1 p.,2 1st and 2nd best bid and ask quotes
q.,1 Q.,2 order book depth, 1st and cumulative depth 2nd quotes
ˆ qbid ˆ qask hidden depth at 1st quotes
XX +τ stock price - current and at t + τ
d sign of market orders (buy market: d =+ 1 ,s e l lm a r k e t :d = −1)
mf (m;h,λ) market order quantity, probability distribution function for m
Iask Ibid iceberg indicators for bid and ask side
Ih Inh iceberg and realized market order indicators
Ih = Iask and Inh = Ibid,i fd =+ 1
Ih = Ibid and Inh = Iask,i fd = −1
hbid =[ 1Ibid Iask] iceberg states - bid side view
hask =[ 1Iask Ibid] iceberg states - ask side view
hmkt =
 
1 Ih Inh 
iceberg states - interacted with realized market order
Model Parameters
α0 =[ αvis
0 αown
0 α
opp
0 ] ﬁxed component of the price impact
α1 =[ αvis
1 αown
1 α
opp
1 ] variable component of the price impact
μ drift of the share price
δ1 =[ δvis
1 δown
1 δ
opp
1 ] marginal compensation for liquidity provision at the 1st quote
δ2 =[ δvis
2 δown
2 δ
opp
2 ] marginal compensation for liquidity provision at the 2nd quote
λ =[ λvis λown λopp] mean market order size
η mean hidden depth
35Table 7: Model Parameter Estimates
Large Medium Small
Panel A: Price Impact Function
αvis
0 1.89 (0.08) 2.70 (0.23) 3.34 (0.33)
αown
0 -1.90 (0.23) -2.08 (0.36) -3.60 (0.85)
α
opp
0 1.22 (0.25) 2.04 (0.42) 3.44 (1.14)
αvis
1 0.44 (0.03) 0.62 (0.06) 0.95 (0.15)
αown
1 -0.22 (0.04) -0.34 (0.06) -0.56 (0.15)
α
opp
1 -0.02 (0.07) -0.08 (0.09) -0.04 (0.28)
μ 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.03 (0.03)
Panel B: Marginal Compensation for Liquidity Provision
δvis
1 -0.80 (0.09) -1.13 (0.20) -1.57 (0.41)
δown
1 1.82 (0.23) 2.59 (0.34) 4.06 (0.93)
δ
opp
1 -1.85 (0.27) -2.33 (0.38) -4.21 (1.13)
δvis
2 1.24 (0.17) 2.41 (0.31) 2.25 (0.66)
δown
2 0.50 (0.53) 1.75 (0.61) 2.28 (1.65)
δ
opp
2 -2.67 (0.50) -2.48 (0.55) -4.73 (1.46)
Panel C: Market Order Size and Hidden Depth
λvis 0.95 (0.00) 0.92 (0.01) 0.94 (0.01)
λown 0.39 (0.01) 0.37 (0.02) 0.51 (0.04)
λopp 0.12 (0.02) 0.17 (0.02) 0.18 (0.09)
η 10.91 (0.13) 9.05 (0.12) 12.35 (0.27)
Table 7 report the average model parameter estimates. The model parameters are estimated using GMM.
Table 6 lists the moment conditions and the model parameters. The second stage estimates are computed
using a Newey-West 10-lag weighting matrix. The model is estimated for each stock and the average param-
eter estimates are reported with the average standard errors in parenthesis. Panel A provides the parameters
for the price impact function, the αs, and the drift (μ). Panel B provides the parameters for the marginal
compensation for liquidity provision. Panel C provides the parameters for the market order ﬂow, the λs,
and for the mean hidden depth, (η).
36Table 8: Marginal Compensation for Liquidity Provision
Large Medium Small
Mean + − Mean + − Mean + −
Best Quote Level
δvis
1 -0.80 0 8 -1.13 0 5 -1.57 0 13
δvis
1 + δown
1 1.02 8 0 1.46 7 0 2.48 9 0
δvis
1 + δ
opp
1 -2.66 0 8 -3.46 0 7 -5.79 0 14
δvis
1 + δown
1 + δ
opp
1 -0.83 0 4 -0.87 0 4 -1.73 0 7
Second Best Quote Level
δvis
2 1.24 8 0 2.41 7 0 2.25 11 0
δvis
2 + δown
2 1.73 6 0 4.15 6 0 4.53 9 0
δvis
2 + δ
opp
2 -1.43 0 3 -0.07 2 1 -2.48 1 5
δvis
2 + δown
2 + δ
opp
2 -0.94 2 1 1.68 2 0 -0.20 1 0
Table 8 reports the mean values of the net marginal compensation for liquidity provision in diﬀerent states
of the order book; no iceberg orders, iceberg order on the same side as the marginal limit (own), iceberg
order on the opposite side (opp), and iceberg orders on both sides (own+opp). The units are basis points.
The marginal compensation is measured in basis points. The mean value of the estimated parameter values
or sums of parameter values are reported and the number of mean values that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 1% level are reported separately for positive and negative values in the columns labeled “+” and
“−.”
37Table 9: Liquidity Provider Surplus
Large Medium Small
P a n e lA :B yO r d e rB o o kS t a t e
No Iceberg State 0.44 (0.08) 0.87 (0.17) 0.64 (0.36)
Iceberg State 0.68 (0.20) 0.70 (0.23) 1.08 (0.84)
Panel B: By Display Condition
Visible Liquidity 0.45 (0.07) 0.74 (0.14) 0.56 (0.33)
No Iceberg State 0.44 (0.08) 0.86 (0.17) 0.63 (0.36)
Iceberg State 0.48 (0.16) 0.42 (0.18) 0.53 (0.67)
Hidden Liquidity 0.19 (0.06) 0.25 (0.07) 0.53 (0.24)
P a n e lC :B yO r d e rB o o kL e v e l
Best Level -0.16 (0.05) -0.30 (0.09) -0.60 (0.22)
No Iceberg State -0.28 (0.05) -0.41 (0.11) -0.76 (0.23)
Iceberg Same 0.83 (0.13) 0.86 (0.15) 1.80 (0.52)
Iceberg Opposite -0.46 (0.06) -0.83 (0.09) -1.35 (0.34)
Second and Third Best Level 0.61 (0.02) 1.04 (0.05) 1.16 (0.12)
No Iceberg State 0.71 (0.03) 1.27 (0.06) 1.39 (0.14)
Iceberg Same 0.07 (0.00) 0.16 (0.01) 0.13 (0.02)
Iceberg Opposite 0.04 (0.03) 0.27 (0.04) -0.02 (0.15)
Table 9 reports the estimated expected surplus accruing to liquidity providers. The expected surplus is computed
using the parameter estimates for the state-dependent market order distribution and price impact function and the
empirical frequencies of buy versus sell orders in each state. The surplus is calculated by integrating the observed
price schedule minus the price impact function with respect to the distribution of market order quantities. Panel
A reports the surplus for all states with (i) no iceberg orders and (ii) states with at least one iceberg order at the
best quotes. In panel B the expected liquidity surplus is split by displayed condition—displayed liquidity versus
non-displayed liquidity—and by state. In panel C the liquidity provider surplus is split by the order book level—best
quote versus the 2nd and 3rd best quotes—and by state. Standard errors in parenthesis take into account ﬁrst-stage
estimation error for the model parameters.
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A1 Detecting Iceberg Orders
We construct an iceberg detection algorithm that uses the order book dynamics to make predictions
of whether or not the bid or the ask side has an iceberg order. The algorithm generates informative
signals and demonstrates that detection of iceberg orders is feasible. D’Hondt and De Winne (2007)
present a similar algorithm and comparable results. In practice, a detection algorithm like the one
that we focus on is only one tool that traders may use to detect hidden liquidity. Bongiovanni,
Borkovec, and Sinclair (2006) use other observable information to detect hidden orders. Traders
may also use active strategies to detect iceberg orders. For example, Hasbrouck and Saar (2004)
show that traders may be using very short-lived (ﬂeeting) limit orders to detect possible hidden
liquidity on INET. When dealing with multiple venues an algorithm may also keep track of the
venues that are most likely to have additional hidden liquidity (Abrokwah and Soﬁanos (2006)).
A1.1 An Algorithm
When a trade occurs that involves the execution of volume in excess of the visible volume at given
price, it is very likely that the price contains an iceberg order. The ratio between total size to
peak size in Table 1 implies that after the replenishing of one peak, additional hidden depth is to
typically expected. This implies that one can detect iceberg orders by comparing the recent history
of transaction prices and volume with the transition of the visible order book.
Our algorithm sets an iceberg-indicator to one every time new depth is added at a price consis-
tent with the replenishment of an iceberg order. The algorithm resets the indicator for that price
to zero only when an event occurs that could not have occurred had the iceberg order remained at
that price. The algorithm stores a speciﬁc indicator and the expected volume until the next replen-
ishment for each price level. The indicator remains unchanged unless a predicted replenishment
fails to occur. The following example illustrates how the algorithm works.
The algorithm maintains and updates a detection vector with the following four elements for all price
levels in the order book: price; detection ﬂag; visible volume; volume until next replenishment. In the
example, the best bid is initially 9.70 and there are no iceberg orders at this price level, i.e., the detection
ﬂag is zero. The ﬁrst two elements (price and detection ﬂag) are listed in the right-side margin. (9.70, 0)
1. A buy iceberg order is submitted at 9.77 with a total size of 9000, a peak size of 1000, implying (9.77, 0)
a hidden volume of 8000 and a visible volume of 1,000 shares. The detection ﬂag is currently zero.
Detection vector: [9.77, 0, 1000, 0].
2. A sell market order for 1200 shares is submitted. The iceberg order’s ﬁrst peak size of 1000 shares (9.77, 1)
is completely executed and another 200 share are automatically executed from the iceberg order’s
second peak size of 1000 shares. The remaining 800 shares of the iceberg order’s second peak size are
displayed in the book. The algorithm sets the detection ﬂag to one and sets the volume until next
replenishment to 800. Detection vector: [9.77, 1, 800, 800].
3. A buy limit order is submitted at 9.79 for 200 shares. The ﬂag for 9.79 is zero. Detection vector: (9.79, 0)
(9.79, 0, 200, 0). There is no change at 9.77 . (9.77, 1)
4. A sell market order for 500 shares is submitted. 200 shares are executed at 9.79, and 300 shares are (9.77, 1)
executed against the second peak size of the iceberg order at 9.77. The detection ﬂag at 9.77 remains
at one, and the volume until next replenishment is revised to 500. Detection vector: [9.77, 1, 500,500].
395. A buy limit order is submitted at 9.77 for 5000 shares. The ﬂag at 9.77 remains at one and volume (9.77, 1)
until replenishment is unchanged because the new limit order is behind the visible 500 share of the
iceberg order’s second peak size. Detection vector: [9.77, 1, 5500, 500].
6. The iceberg order at 9.77 is cancelled. The detection ﬂag remains at one.9 Detection vector: [9.77, (9.77, 1)
1, 5000, 500].
7. A sell market order is submitted for 600 shares. The ﬂag is reset to zero as the volume until next (9.77, 0)
replenishment is exceeded without the expected replenishment. Detection vector: [9.77, 0, 4500, 0].
A1.2 Performance
The algorithm will make both type I and type II errors. We take as the null a prediction of no
iceberg orders. Table A2 reports the average frequencies of type I and II errors across the four
trading activity groups. The average frequency of type I errors is approximately one percent. The
average frequency of type II errors is between three and ﬁve percent. Around a third of all iceberg
states are not discovered because the iceberg order remains completely unexecuted. Our results
are comparable to those of D’Hondt and De Winne (2007).
Of course, we cannot determine to what extent the predictions from our algorithm closely
approximates the predictions of the market participants. Conversations with market participants
suggest that it is reasonable to assume that active participants are able to collect this type of
information. It may also be the case that at least some market participants apply algorithms that
generate even more accurate predictions. For example, we have not used information in order sizes
or any other characteristics that tends to be diﬀerent for iceberg orders. We have also explored
whether there is any evidence that immediate-or-cancel orders may be used to detect iceberg orders
but while such orders are used quite frequently the connection to iceberg states is rather weak.
A1.3 Robustness of Model Parameter Estimates
We re-estimate the model parameters using the same moment conditions as above, but by letting
the indicators generated by the detection algorithm determine the values of the indicator variables.
Table A3 provides a comparison of the δ estimates obtained in the baseline case—labeled “True”—
and in the case of the detection algorithm labeled “Algorithm.” Overall, the parameter estimates
are fairly close. The price impact parameters and the order ﬂow parameters are also fairly similar
suggestion that our main ﬁndings for the compensation for liquidity provision are robust to some
degree of uncertainty about the iceberg orders.
9In principle, the algorithm could make use of the fact that the remaining volume of 5,000 at 9.77 exactly matches
the size of the previously submitted limit order to infer that it is very likely that the drop in the visible volume at
9.77 was caused by the iceberg being cancelled. However, if the limit order in question was for 500 shares instead of
5,000 shares, it would be a ﬁfty-ﬁfty chance that the cancellation was due to the iceberg order. Our algorithm has
not been optimized with respect to these scenarios so it is possible that its performance could be enhanced.
40A2 Surplus Calculation
The formulas presented in sections 4.4 and ?? are independent of the choice of the market order
size distribution. Below we provide details about the surplus calculation given the choice of an
exponential distribution.
The expected surplus, πk(q), of a liquidity provider for unit q in equation (6) is
πk(q)=Pr(d =1 ;h)
 
pk − X − μ − (α0h) − (α1h)(q + λh)
  
1 − e−
q
λh
 
(A 1)
The aggregate expected surplus of a quote, used in equations (7) and (8), in the case of the
exponential distribution is calculated by
Π=Pr(d =1 ;h)(λh)
  
pk − X − μ − (α0h) − (α1h)(λh)
  
e−
Qs
λh − e−
Qe
λh
 
+( α1h)
 
Qs
 
e−
Qs
λh
 
− Qe
 
e−
Qe
λh
   
(A 2)
where the quote starts at Qs and ends at Qe. The two formulas above are valid for the ask side,
similar equations can be derived for the bid side.
A two stage approach is applied for the standard errors of the surplus expressions. The ﬁrst
stage considers the uncertainty of the estimated parameters of the GMM model via the delta
method. The second stage errors are those of the sample average used to calculate the surplus
expressions itself. The two errors are combined assuming independence. Denote S as one of the
surplus calculations, then an estimator of the variance of S ˆ σ2
S is derived by the following expression
ˆ σ2
S =
∂S
∂θ 
ˆ V(ˆ θ)
∂S
∂θ
+ s2
S (A 3)
where ˆ V(θ) is the estimated variance matrix of the model parameters and s2
S is the sampling
variance of the surplus calculation. The gradient vector of the surplus expression to the parameters
∂S
∂θ is calculated numerically.
41Table A1: Descriptive Statistics: Sample Stocks
Ticker Mkt. Cap Trad. Vol. Mid-Quote Trades Trade Size Bid-Ask Spread
Symbol [ b] [ b] [ ] [1000] [1000 shrs] [b.p.] [ cents]
Large ALV 33.8 18.6 99.5 289.1 0.6 4.6 4.5
DBK 38.2 19.8 67.6 253.4 1.2 4.0 2.7
DCX 30.3 12.0 36.3 211.6 1.6 5.2 1.9
DTE 34.9 22.4 15.6 284.4 5.0 7.1 1.1
EOA 33.8 10.3 52.5 183.7 1.1 4.5 2.4
MUV2 16.4 13.3 93.6 218.9 0.6 4.6 4.3
SAP 27.4 11.8 131.0 179.4 0.5 4.6 6.0
SIE 52.9 20.6 63.7 282.5 1.1 3.9 2.5
Mean 33.5 16.1 70.0 237.9 1.5 4.8 3.2
Medium BAS 25.4 8.0 43.1 165.1 1.1 4.7 2.0
BAY 15.9 5.7 22.8 153.5 1.6 7.1 1.6
BMW 12.2 5.6 34.7 134.9 1.2 5.6 1.9
HVM 6.6 6.3 18.5 123.7 2.8 9.2 1.7
IFX 4.8 9.4 11.6 179.0 4.5 10.0 1.2
RWE 12.7 6.3 33.9 148.0 1.2 5.9 2.0
VOW 9.7 6.7 39.2 162.8 1.0 5.2 2.0
Mean 12.5 6.8 29.1 152.4 1.9 6.8 1.8
Small ADS 4.1 2.0 92.5 62.6 0.4 6.7 6.1
ALT 3.3 2.0 48.8 69.9 0.6 7.4 3.6
CBK 7.6 3.4 15.3 92.7 2.4 9.6 1.5
CONT 4.1 1.6 31.5 64.0 0.8 8.8 2.8
DB1 4.8 2.3 47.0 62.8 0.8 7.0 3.3
DPW 6.8 2.8 18.2 84.1 1.8 9.3 1.7
FME 1.9 0.8 53.8 39.7 0.4 9.4 5.0
HEN3 3.7 1.2 65.8 44.9 0.4 7.3 4.8
LHA 4.5 2.8 14.1 86.5 2.3 10.6 1.5
LIN 3.4 1.4 43.6 57.3 0.6 7.5 3.3
MAN 2.4 1.8 27.7 67.6 0.9 9.1 2.5
MEO 5.0 2.5 34.8 79.0 0.9 8.4 2.9
SCH 7.1 3.3 41.0 97.4 0.8 6.7 2.7
TKA 6.4 2.4 15.8 80.7 1.9 10.7 1.7
TUI 2.0 1.7 18.7 67.8 1.3 11.5 2.1
Mean 4.5 2.1 37.9 70.5 1.1 8.7 3.0
All Mean 14.1 7.0 44.4 134.2 1.4 7.2 2.8
The table reports the market capitalization, the trading volume, the average mid-quote, the total number of trades,
the average trade size (1000 shares), and the average relative (basis points) and absolute (euro cents) bid-ask spreads
for the sample stocks. The market capitalization is calculated using a free-ﬂoat methodology. It is measured in
billions of euros as of December 31st, 2003.
42Table A2: Iceberg Detection Algorithm
Large Medium Small
Prediction Prediction Prediction
True State No Iceberg Iceberg Sum No Iceberg Iceberg Sum No Iceberg Iceberg Sum
No Iceberg 89.8 1.0 90.8 84.9 1.4 86.3 89.9 0.8 90.7
Iceberg 3.0 6.2 9.2 4.5 9.1 13.7 3.1 6.2 9.3
Sum 92.8 7.2 100.0 89.4 10.6 100.0 93.0 7.0 100.0
The table reports the average of the percentages of predictions (no iceberg versus iceberg) generated by the
iceberg detection algorithm across the percentages of the true iceberg state (no iceberg versus iceberg). The
columns of each 2×2 matrix correspond to the algorithm’s predictions and the rows correspond to the true
states. Entries on the diagonal correspond to correct predictions. The average percentage of Type I errors
is in the top right corner with Type II errors in the bottom left corner. The results are averaged for the bid
and ask side for each stock and averaged across stock for the large, medium, and small sub-samples.
43Table A3: Robustness of Select Parameter Estimates
Large Medium Small
δ1 true -0.80 (0.09) -1.13 (0.20) -1.57 (0.41)
algorithm -0.72 (0.09) -0.95 (0.19) -1.24 (0.38)
δown
1 true 1.82 (0.23) 2.59 (0.34) 4.06 (0.93)
algorithm 1.28 (0.22) 1.95 (0.34) 3.02 (0.87)
δ
opp
1 true -1.85 (0.27) -2.33 (0.38) -4.21 (1.13)
algorithm -2.10 (0.26) -2.76 (0.37) -5.08 (1.02)
δ2 true 1.24 (0.17) 2.41 (0.31) 2.25 (0.66)
algorithm 1.22 (0.18) 2.64 (0.30) 2.65 (0.61)
δown
2 true 0.50 (0.53) 1.75 (0.61) 2.28 (1.65)
algorithm 0.58 (0.53) 1.19 (0.58) 1.45 (1.55)
δ
opp
2 true -2.67 (0.50) -2.48 (0.55) -4.73 (1.46)
algorithm -2.70 (0.50) -3.22 (0.54) -6.08 (1.43)
The table reports the estimates for the δ parameters of the model for the case in which iceberg states are
observed without error—rows labeled ‘true’—and the case in which iceberg states are detected using the
algorithm—rows labeled ‘algorithm.’ The average parameter estimates are reported with average standard
errors in parentheses.
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